The Shootout Final Table

I was so excited to make a WSOP final table. I slept well, but once I woke up there was no chance of falling back asleep. I was very scared of busting out early at the final table. 9^th place paid less than $10,000, 8^th was less than $13k, and 7^th was less than $16k. It feels like making the final table of a WSOP event with 900 players should automatically pay more than that. It would have been a huge disappointment to bust early. Big final tables don’t come often so there’s a lot of pressure to maximize when you get there. Right away I noticed an unusual, huge jump from 5^th to 4^th. I play every tournament for first place, but getting down to 4 was definitely on my mind.

The entire final table was televised with one-hour delay by worldseriesofpoker.com with color commentary from Jeff Madsen and Tom Schneider. Many of my recollections are based on the video of the final table that I have since watched. The final table was

Seat One Don Baruch

Seat Two Daniel Negreanu

Seat Three Jared Davis

Seat Four Thomas Fuller

Seat Five Fred Goldberg

Seat Six Brandon Lee

Seat Seven Michael Wehner

Seat Eight Doug Baughman

Seat Nine Erick Lindgren

Everyone started with 300k with blinds at 3k-6k and a 1k ante.

For television, they had us play in a small, blacked out room. We were allowed one guest apiece but I snuck in MasterJ along with PiMaster. I had never played with hole card cameras and, at first, it was a little uncomfortable. My chips were in the way and I struggled to show the cards to the cameras. The producers asked me a few times to hold my cards higher and longer for the camera.

Since this was a shootout, the players had not played with each other in the tournament until the final table and everyone came in with the same chip stack. I knew a decent amount about the games of Negreanu, Lindgren, and Goldberg, but nothing about anyone else. No one knew anything about me other than what they could find on the internet.

I was planning on playing my usual super-tight early game as I had the first two tables. I raised the second hand with [Ad Td] in early position and everyone folded. A couple hands later I got a walk. After this I didn’t play a hand for quite a while. The other guys were playing quite tight also.

There was a lot of banter at the table, mostly between Erick and Daniel. Daniel is perhaps the funniest guy I have ever seen at a poker table. His schtick was actually much funnier in person than on tv.

Erick and Fred got involved in a pot where Fred limp-called a large raise with [5d 4d] against Erick’s [Ad Jd] and wound up winning it with a pair of fives on a scary board. This hand appeared to put both players on tilt – Erick was annoyed Fred called such a big raise with such a small hand and annoyed at himself for not buying the pot postflop; Fred may have gotten annoyed at Erick’s light chastising.

After folding a couple rounds Erick raised my big blind and I called with [Kc Tc]. The flop came [Ts 9s 3s] and I had to decide on a course of action. I thought about leading out but don’t like that play against an aggressive player like Lindgren unless you are comfortable with your hand. Madsen like a checkraise, which I really don’t like, because it would commit such a big chunk of my stack and give Erick the opportunity to push me out with a big draw with the [As] or a hand like [Qs Jd]. I decided to check and call and think this is the best play.

The turn was the [5c]. Madsen said he would have liked me to bet out and I tend to agree. I didn’t because I felt like I wouldn’t gain much information from a bet out (Erick could raise with an unmade hand or smoothcall with a big one, leaving me informationless to make a river decision). Still, I think betting out would have been a good play because it wouldn’t give him much info and my hand was quite vulnerable.

Erick checked behind so I thought I probably had the best hand, and the river came [7c]. I now had to decide if I wanted to check and call or bet. I decided if I bet Erick would only raise with a high flush, and he might call with many hands, maybe any pair. It looked like I might have two high cards with a spade. Schneider and Madsen thought the best play was to check-call. I think it’s quite close, but prefer betting against a professional like Lindgren who is more likely to make thin calls and less likely to bluff rivers. I bet about 60% of the pot and Erick folded what I later learned was [Ad Jh]. Considering what he had checking would have been better but I’m happy with my decision to bet.

Erick and Brandon Lee were the most aggressive players at the table in the early going. Brandon was playing the most hands and doing a lot of preflop reraising. We all thought he was a maniac but the video reveals he was just picking up a lot of big hands. During this stretch I tried a button raise of his blind with [Ts 9c] but Brandon reraised (with what turned out to be [Ac Kd] and I instafolded.

Daniel won a big race to bust Fred and we were at eight. I raised [Ah Kh] in early position and Brandon, now directly to my left, made a 3x reraise. I felt he was tremendously strong this time. He had reraised me a few hands ago so wouldn’t want to do it again without a big one. His body language was strong and confident. I was in early position and he was right behind me. I never thought about coming back over the top because of my read. I considered calling but eventually decided to just fold. This was a classic Moon weak-tight cash-game based play and a questionable tournament laydown, even considering my read and the state of the tournament. It turned out Lee had [Jh Jd].

My next big blind Erick limped and I checked with [9d 7s]. The flop came [Th 6s Td] and I checked. Erick bet as expected and I decided he couldn’t just have the pot that easily. I knew a call would scare the crap out of him so I decided to do that and buy the pot later. However, the turn was the [Ts]. My plans to represent a ten were now foiled. I checked and Erick bet, which surprised me. I figured he’d check behind there with or without a hand. I couldn’t see him betting without a pair bigger than sixes so I quickly folded. It turned out he had [Kh Kd].

I folded the next couple orbits and then a strange hand came up. Baruch doubled the 8k big blind to 16 in early position, which he hadn’t been doing. Usually he was raising 3-5x the blind. I looked down at [Kh Ks] and really wasn’t too happy about it. I felt Baruch probably had aces or some crap like a suited connector. I thought reraising would accomplish nothing, but I didn’t want to let a bunch of players in behind me. I eventually made it 50k. When it got back to Baruch he took a long time before calling, which had me even more puzzled. The flop came [Ah 5d 4h] and Baruch immediately went all-in for 2x the pot. It almost seemed like he was going to go all-in no matter what hit.

I sort of thought about calling, but not really. I didn’t know what to put him on but I can’t just call it off with kings on an ace-high board, as Madsen and Schneider said. Baruch had [Ad Jd]. I have no idea what he was thinking at any point in the hand.

I raised the next hand with [Ad Ts] figuring no one would mess with me but both Lee and Wehner called in position. The flop came [8d 8s 4s] and I thought for a while about betting. I decided at least one of them probably had a pair and wouldn’t fold to a bet so I checked and folded to Wehner’s bet. It turned out Lee flopped quads with [8c 8h] so in this case my weak-tight play worked out for the best. In addition, the [As] hit the turn, so I got bailed out by Wehner’s attempted steal with [Jd Td].

Play lulled after this and Erick was the next to go. After a short break, Baruch raised in late position and I found [Kh Kd] in the small blind. Baruch raised habitually in late position and I needed a double-up (it turned out he had [5d 3d], so I decided to slowplay. Lee thought for a while in the big blind, then called. It looked like he was contemplating a reraise but decided to just call. The flop came [Jd 8s 4s] and I led for 25k. Lee quickly made a small raise to 60k and I put him on a big hand. I was worried he flopped a set but there was no folding at this point so I went all-in for about 100k more when Baruch folded. Lee quickly called with [Ah Js] and I doubled up when the [Kc] hit the turn. This was a brutal cooler for Brandon that couldn’t have been avoided when I decided to slowplay.

It should be noted that Baughman made the play of the day, betting a [Qd 3c 5h] flop with [Ah 3s], then reraising when Daniel checkraised. Baughman may have played the best of anyone that day, but he was extremely card-dead and busted in a massive pot with [Qc Tc] against Negreanu’s [Ad Kh] on a flop of [Ks Jc 3c].

After a second break I limped the small blind with [4c 4s] and Brandon raised from the big blind. I called and the flop came [Kh 9h 4h]. I checked and Brandon made a substantial bet. I felt like he hit it pretty good so I immediately announced all-in. Brandon instacalled me again with [Ks Qh], I dodged a heart, and doubled up to second in chips. The two double-ups against Brandon were pretty much dumb luck. If the cards had been reversed, he would likely have doubled. I think I played the hands well but it didn’t really matter.

The next hand I played was [Ts 9h] under the gun. This was my best steal position with Daniel in the small blind. I raised and only Daniel called. The flop came [Jd 8s 5h] and I bet 50k after Daniel checked. He called. The turn was the [6c] and I had an interesting decision after Daniel checked. Some people have said that the six on the turn was likely to help Daniel’s hand, and therefore I should check. I do think this card will often help him out, but I also didn’t think he had two pair. I really thought he would bet out there with two pair on that board especially with me raising under the gun and betting the flop. Also, I didn’t think he would raise me with anything less than two pair since we were the two chip leaders. I ultimately decided to bet 100k on the turn hoping Daniel would fold a hand like [A 8] or [A 5]. He thought for a bit and then called.

The river came [2s] and Daniel checked again. This is where I blew the bracelet. If I had bet the river, Daniel would have been in a terrible spot and a call would have been heroic. There was no reason whatsoever to think I could have anything but a monster there. Both Madsen and Schneider commented that once I bet the turn, I was committed to the bluff and needed to bet the river. I completely agree. The line here was to check the turn or bet both the turn and river. It was hard to bet the river after getting called twice by a great player (and loose caller) like Negreanu but a world-class player would have fired the river there and picked up the pot. Hands like this make all the difference.

Daniel busted Lee and Wehner and suddenly we were down to 4. I had gone card dead and lost several small pots, 20-70k at a time. I think I played most of these hands properly but I wasn’t hitting anything. With the fast play and consolidation, I was soon the short stack. One hand I totally screwed up was when Jared limped from the small blind and I checked [Qs Jd] in the big blind. The flop came [As 6s 6d] and he quickly checked, which worried me. I checked behind. The turn was the [3c] and it again went check-check. The river was the [3d] and now Jared bet out. I was honestly thinking that I had queen high here and not the board. Unbelievably I did not realize that I was playing the board. I was thinking about all the hands queen high could beat and eventually called. Even thinking I had queen high this was a dumb call cause I felt Jared had something all along. What an idiot I am sometimes.

Another one I tried to trap the short-stacked Wehner (in the big blind) by limping [Ad Qd] from the small blind after Baruch limped, but he just checked and I folded to a bet and a call on the [Jc 9d 6c] flop. Another Daniel raised and I called with [2c 2s]. The flop came [Qc 9c 6s] and Daniel quickly checked. I felt like he had hit it in some way so I checked. The turn was the [9d], Daniel bet out, and I folded. He had [Th 8h] for a double gutshot.

I raised a couple hands and ran into big pairs and suddenly I was down to thirteen big blinds. I found [Ad 5d] in first position and shoved in. Considering the tight, passive nature of the table and the chip stacks, I think this was a bad shove. I could have raised and folded if someone came over the top, knowing I was dominated. Jared woke up with [Ah Ac] and I was finished.

Overall I really didn’t play great poker, especially at the final table. I actually played better in the three subsequent tournaments I played at the WSOP. The first round I ran good, didn’t run into hands when I had moderate holdings, took advantage of a couple weak players, and played well heads up. The second round I had a bunch of huge hands at an aggressive table, made one mistake heads up, and got lucky. The third round I coolered Brandon Lee twice, then went card-dead and ran out of gas. Nowhere in there did I do anything special.

I attribute my result to three causes:

1) I was extremely enthusiastic throughout the tournament, always thinking positive thoughts and believing I was going to win.

2) I had a lot of good cards, took only one bad beat, and flopped a ton of sets.

3) I have run quite poorly in live tournaments, so it was only a matter of time before good things started happening to me.

I learned a ton from playing the tournament and watching the final table. My table presence is pretty terrible. It’s something we’ve worked on before (Mike Odeh was a master of table presence and often discussed its importance) but I get sloppy at times. Since watching myself play on tv I’ve put a lot of emphasis on better posture and presence. I’m also trying to stare players down or look into space rather than covering my face with my hands. Finally, I’m going to try to play even slower than I usually do and think even more heavily about my decisions. The difference between good and average players is so small. One or two pots per day can make the difference. If I had picked up that pot with the busted straight draw, I would have been in contention for the bracelet.

Making a WSOP final table was a great experience, one of the most exciting events of my poker career. At first I was relatively happy with the $68k score, but now I realize how fleeting those opportunities are and I’m hungry to return. Thanks to all the people who supported me before, during, and after the tournament. Records were set for text messages, emails, phone calls, and blog comments. I hope to surpass this result soon, if for no other reason than to set a new blog comment record.